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Abstract This paper presents an axiomatic framework for the priority heuristic, a
model of bounded rationality in Selten’s (in: Gigerenzer and Selten (eds.) Bounded
rationality: the adaptive toolbox, 2001) spirit of using empirical evidence on heuristics.
The priority heuristic predicts actual human choices between risky gambles well. It
implies violations of expected utility theory such as common consequence effects,
common ratio effects, the fourfold pattern of risk taking and the reflection effect. We
present an axiomatization of a parameterized version of the heuristic which generalizes
the heuristic in order to account for individual differences and inconsistencies. The
axiomatization uses semiorders (Luce, Econometrica 24:178–191, 1956), which have
an intransitive indifference part and a transitive strict preference component. The
axiomatization suggests new testable predictions of the priority heuristic and makes it
easier for theorists to study the relation between heuristics and other axiomatic theories
such as cumulative prospect theory.
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1 Introduction
Expected utility theory remains to this day the dominant decision theoretic framework.
Much of the appeal of expected utility theory lies in its elegant axiomatic characteri-
zations (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; Savage 1954), which lend themselves
to a normative reading. It has, however, been shown empirically that the axioms of
expected utility are systematically violated by people. For instance, Allais (1953)
has demonstrated violations of the independence axiom, and Kahneman and Tversky
have empirically identified a number of violations of expected utility theory, including
framing effects, the reflection effect and the fourfold pattern of risk-taking (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). For a review of non-expected utility
theories, see Starmer (2000).
An alternative approach for studying human decision making is to start by investi-
gating how human beings make choices in the real world. To obtain a more realistic
account of human decision making, Selten (2001) and, before, Simon (1991), have
called for a theory of bounded rationality that is based on an empirical analysis of the
cognitive processes that lead to choice. The formal study of simple heuristics provides
one approach towards this end (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001). A heuristic is a strategy
that relies on limited search for information and does not involve sophisticated cal-
culations. Instead, it is composed of rules for search, stopping and decision making
consistent with the observation that people often search for information sequentially
in time and stop search at some point rather than engaging in exhaustive search. A
limitation of this approach is that it has so far not been characterized axiomatically.
This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of a family of lexicographic theories
of choice, which includes the priority heuristic as a special case. The priority heuristic
concerns binary decisions between gambles. It is remarkable because it predicts the
choices between gambles of the majority well (Brandstätter et al. 2006). Furthermore,
it can account for a number of violations of expected utility theory, in particular the
common consequence and common ratio effects, reflection effects and the fourfold
pattern of risk taking (Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer 2008). An axiomatization will
be helpful in at least two ways: First, it will make it possible for theorists to study
the relation of the priority heuristic to other axiomatic theories, such as cumulative
prospect theory (see Wakker and Tversky 1993). Second, it will allow for new empirical
tests via the axioms of the heuristic. Our axiomatization builds on Luce (1978).
The representation given here is for a parameterized version of the priority heuristic.
While the version of the heuristic with fixed parameters predicts the data well, there
is a need for a parameterized version as well. For example, parameters are needed in
order to account for individual differences, and for inconsistencies in choice (Rieskamp
2008). The axiomatization suggested here makes no claims with respect to parameters.
Studying this generalization of the priority heuristic does not mean that we advocate
a research program in which heuristics are populated with parameters, to be fitted
anew to each data set. Rather, we see the generalization as covering other possible
fixed parameters of the priority heuristic, in case that independent theory or evidence
suggests such fixed values in some situations.
The representation uses semiorders (Luce 1956), which have a transitive strict pref-
erence part and an intransitive indifference part. In particular, the concept of intransitive
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indifference entails that an agent may be indifferent between any two elements that
are too similar for the agent to form a strict preference between them. However, while
several elements may be judged indifferent, beyond a certain threshold indifference
may switch to strict preference. This seems reasonable and consistent with real world
evidence, since utility may not be perfectly discriminable.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces the priority heuristic and reviews
relevant analytical and empirical results. Section 3 presents a representation theorem
for the heuristic in choices where gambles differ on two attributes (an outcome and a
probability). Section 4 concludes with a discussion of the present contribution to the
foundations of a theory of bounded rationality in the sense of Selten (2001) and Simon
(1991).
2 The priority heuristic
The priority heuristic is a model of how people make choices between gambles. Its
domain concerns difficult risky-choice problems, that is, problems in which no alter-
native dominates the other and expected values are close (ratio ≤2). A large part of the
evidence on people’s choice behaviour derives from simple monetary gambles. The
priority heuristic proposes that people make choices by using at most three attributes:
The minimum outcome, the probability of the minimum outcome and the maximum
outcome. For choosing between two gambles with nonnegative outcomes (then called
gains), the priority heuristic has a search rule, stopping rule and decision rule (Brand-
stätter et al. 2006):
Search rule: Go through attributes in the order: Minimum gain, probability of
minimum gain, maximum gain.
Stopping rule: Stop search if the minimum gains differ by 1/10, or more, of the
maximum gain (across the two gambles); otherwise, stop search if probabilities of the
minimum gains differ by .1 or more.
Decision rule: Choose the gamble that is more attractive in the attribute (gain or
probability) that stopped search.
The more attractive gamble is the one with the higher (minimum or maximum)
gain or with the lower probability of minimum gain. For negative outcomes (the
minimum and maximum outcomes are then called losses), the difference in the
statement of the heuristic is that “gain” is replaced by “loss”. The more attrac-
tive loss is the lower one and the more attractive probability of minimum loss is
the higher one. The logic of the priority heuristic also applies to mixed gambles:
the priority heuristic then holds that first the minimum gains (losses) are compared,
and if the difference between minimum gains exceeds 1/10 of the maxmimum out-
come across the two gambles, maximum outcomes are compared and the gamble
with the higher maximum outcome is chosen. Our axiomatization refer to gambles
with gains and it will be obvious how they would be restated for gambles with
losses.
Formally, we axiomatize a relation , defined on X × P × Y , where X is the set
of minimum outcomes, P is the set of probabilities of minimum outomes and Y is the
set of maximum outcomes, such that (x1, p1, y1)  (x2, p2, y2) iff
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(i) x1 − x2 > max{y1, y2}10 , or
(ii) |x1 − x2| ≤ max{y1, y2}10 and
p2 − p1 > .1 , or
(iii) |x1 − x2| ≤ max{y1, y2}10 and
|p2 − p1| ≤ .1 and
y1 ≥ y2
The priority heuristic is lexicographic in the sense that an attribute is used for making
a choice only if the attributes that precede it in the search order do not allow making
a choice (see also Luce 1956). For more discussion on the heuristic, for example, on
why the aspiration levels for stopping were fixed to .1, see Brandstätter et al. (2006)
and Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer (2008).
To illustrate how the heuristic works, consider one of the problems posed by Allais
(1953, p. 527), known as the Allais paradox, where people first choose between gam-
bles A and B:
A : 100, 000, 000 with probability 1.00
B : 500, 000, 000 with probability .10
100, 000, 000 with probability .89
0 with probability .01
By subtracting a .89 probability to win 100 million from both gambles A and B,
Allais obtained the following gambles, C and D:
C : 100, 000, 000 with probability .11
0 with probability .89
D : 500, 000, 000 with probability .10
0 with probability .90
The majority of people chose gamble A over B and D over C (MacCrimmon 1968),
and this constitutes a violation of the independence axiom. Expected utility theory
does not predict whether A or B will be chosen; it only makes conditional predictions
such as “if A is chosen from A and B, then C is chosen from C and D.” The priority
heuristic, in contrast, makes stronger predictions: It predicts whether A or B will be
chosen, and whether C or D will be chosen. Consider the choice between A and B. The
maximum gain across the two gambles is 500 million, and therefore the aspiration level
for gains is 50 million. The difference between the minimum gains equals 100 − 0 =
100 million, which exceeds the aspiration level, and search is stopped. The gamble
with the more attractive minimum gain is A. Thus, the heuristic predicts the majority
choice correctly. In the choice between C and D, minimum gains are equal. Thus, the
next attribute is looked up. The difference between the probabilities of minimum gains
equals .90 − .89 = .01, which is smaller than the aspiration level for probabilities of
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.1. Thus, the choice is decided by the last attribute, maximum gain, in which gamble D
is more attractive. This prediction is again consistent with the choice of the majority.
More generally, Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer (2008) have shown mathematically
that the priority heuristic implies common consequence effects, common ratio effects,
reflection effects and the fourfold pattern of risk attitude. In fact, because the para-
meters of the heuristic (the order in which attributes are searched, and the aspiration
levels that stop attribute search) are fixed, the priority heuristic implies the effects
simultaneously.
On the other hand, modifications of expected utility theory, such as cumulative
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), that are consistent with the effects
by appropriately setting parameters, cannot simultaneously account for the empirical
evidence (Neilson and Stowe 2002). Neilson and Stowe (2002) also showed that no
parameter combinations allow for these two behaviours and a series of choices made
by a large majority of participants and reasonable risk premia. Similarly, Blavatskyy
(2010) showed that the conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory
do not explain the St. Petersburg paradox. Overall, in multi-parameter models, the
parameter values fitted to one set of data are not necessarily robust, in the sense of
generating accurate predictions for new sets of data. For more on the importance of
distinguishing between fitting and prediction in economic modelling, see Harless and
Camerer (1994); Binmore and Shaked (2010); Erev et al. (2010).
No model of risky choice can predict people’s behaviour in every pair of gamble
correctly; therefore, it is crucial that researchers refrain from constructing pairs that
fit their model when testing it against competing theories. To avoid such a possible
bias, Brandstätter et al. (2006) tested the predictive power of the priority heuristic
exclusively against sets of gambles designed by the authors of competing theories
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Lopes and Oden 1999) as
well as randomly generated gambles (Erev et al. 2002; Brandstätter et al. 2006). These
test sets included two-outcome gambles, five-outcome gambles and choices based on
certainty equivalents. Across 260 pairs of gambles, the priority heuristic predicted 87 %
of majority choices correctly, while cumulative prospect theory predicted 77 % (the
second most predictive theory was the security-potential/aspiration theory of Lopes
and Oden, with 79 % of majority choices).
The limits of the predictive power of the priority heuristic were analyzed using 450
pairs of gambles designed by Mellers et al. (1992). The priority heuristic was more
predictive than the modifications of expected utility theory when the problems were
difficult (i.e. the ratio of the expected values of the two gambles was ≤2) but not when
problems were easy (ratio >2) or dominated. For easy problems, however, none of
the modifications of expected utility theory could outperform the simple theory of
expected value (for a discussion of the evidence, see Birnbaum 2008 and Brandstätter
et al. 2006). These studies suggest that non-linear transformations of probabilities
or monetary values may be needed neither for easy problems nor for difficult ones.
Difficult problems can be modeled by the priority heuristic and easy ones by expected
value theory, each of which is based on non-transformed values and probabilities. This
result clarifies that “overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting of large
probabilities”, which is often evoked to account for anomalies, is in fact not necessary.
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Leland (2010) distinguishes three approaches towards descriptive theories of
choice. What he calls the “road taken” is the representation of lotteries as prospects
that leads to a preoccupation with explaining violations of independence and has led
to a plethora of modifications of expected utility theories, such as prospect theory.
A representation of lotteries in terms of Savage’s action-by-state matrices instead of
prospects, however, makes violations of independence transparent, infrequent, and
not the main problem. In this approach, the “road less travelled”, more substantial
violations such as transitivity and preference for dominated-alternatives become more
central, as in regret theory (Loomes and Sugden 1987). Common to both approaches,
nevertheless, is that choices are interpreted as revealing properties of preferences. In
the third approach, the “road not taken”, choices do not reveal properties of the pref-
erences, but instead properties of the decision processes that individuals use to satisfy
their preferences. The priority heuristic is a formal model of this third approach, as
are the similarity models by Rubinstein (1988) and Leland (1994, 2002).
3 Axiomatization of two-attribute lexicographic heuristics
3.1 Preliminaries
This section assumes that the two gambles have equal minimum gains.1 This means
that this section ignores the first step of the priority heuristic, where minimum gains
are compared.
Let P and Y be sets containing the attributes of the gambles. A gamble is a pair
(p, y) with p ∈ P and y ∈ Y , where p denotes the probability of the maximum2
outcome and y the value of the maximum outcome. Let  be a binary relation on
P × Y , the preference relation over gambles. The relation  is not assumed to be
transitive.
Assume that  is independent in the following sense: For all p1, p2 in P and for
all y1, y2 in Y ,
(p1, y1)  (p2, y1) iff (p1, y2)  (p2, y2) (1)
(p1, y1)  (p1, y2) iff (p2, y1)  (p2, y2) (2)
Statement 1 induces an unambiguous order on P , denoted P , and statement 2 induces
the unambiguous order on Y , denoted Y .
Furthermore, we define strict preference, , and indifference, ∼, in terms of  in
the usual sense: For all p1, p2 in P , and for all y1, y2 in Y ,
1 Some important empirical evidence, such as the possibility effect of Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
refers to zero minimum outcomes; Rubinstein (1988) also makes this assumption.
2 The priority heuristic, as stated in Sect. 2, compares probabilities of minimum outcomes. Given the
additivity of probabilities, for gambles with two outcomes the probability of the maximum outcome is the
complement of the probability of minimum outcomes. For convenience, we consider the mathematically
equivalent case where the probabilities of maximum outcomes are compared.
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(p1, y1)  (p2, y2) iff (p1, y1)  (p2, y2) and not (p2, y2)  (p1, y1) (3)
(p1, y1) ∼ (p2, y2) iff (p1, y1)  (p2, y2) and (p2, y2)  (p1, y1) (4)
Note that neither  nor ∼ can be assumed to be transitive, since the weak prefer-
ence relation  is not assumed to be transitive. The strict preference and indifference
relations on P and Y , P , ∼P , Y and ∼Y are defined similarly.
Next we define another relation on R, denoted RP , which expresses the lexico-
graphic nature of the decision rule of the priority heuristic. The following definition
of RP expresses the fact that the first attribute searched, probabilities, dominates the
second attribute searched, maximum outcomes: For all p1, p2 in P
p1 RP p2 iff for every y1, y2 in Y, (p1, y1)  (p2, y2) (5)
Suppose R is a binary relation on P . Then we can define two other relations, I (R)
and W (R) in terms of it. The interpretation we would like to give to these relations is
that I (R) is an indifference relation on P , and W (R) is a weak preference relation on
P which is defined in a non-standard way (Luce 1956, 1978).
p1 I (R)p2 iff not p1 Rp2 and not p2 Rp1 (6)
p1W (R)p2 iff either
(i) p1 Rp2 or (7)
(i i) p1 I (R)p2 and there exists a p3 in P
such that p1 I (R)p3 and p3 Rp2, or
(i i i) p1 I (R)p2 and there exists a p4 in R
such that p1 Rp4 and p4 I (R)p2
This definition expresses the intuition that one probability is weakly preferred to a
second probability if (i) the first probability is strictly preferred to the second, or
(ii) the first and second probabilities are indistinguishable, and there exists a third
probability that is indistinguishable from the first and strictly preferred to the second,
or (iii) the first and second probabilities are indistinguishable, and there exists a fourth
probability such that the first probability is strongly preferred to the fourth, and the
fourth probability is indistinguishable from the second.
This intuition is expressed by the stopping rule of the priority heuristic: A user of
the heuristic may weakly prefer obtaining the maximum outcome with a probability
of p1 = .23 to obtaining it with a probability of p2 = .22. This weak preference may
arise not because s/he has a strong preference for .23 over .22, but rather because s/he
cannot discriminate between the two probabilities of .23 and .22, and there exists a
third probability, e.g. p3 = .33, such that s/he has a strict preference for .33 over .22
and cannot distinguish between .33 and .23; this is an example of case (ii) just above.
Let us now turn to the definition of a semiorder, as presented by Luce (1956). A
semiorder is characterized by the properties of having a transitive strict preferences
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part, and an intransitive indifference part. These properties make semiorders particu-
larly well suited to modelling the behaviour of people who may express indifference
between two elements they can essentially not distinguish. Nevertheless, there may
exist a threshold beyond which indifference switches to strict preference. A semiorder
is defined as follows:
A binary relation R on P is a semiorder iff, for all p1, p2 in R
(i) not p1 Rp1 (8)
(i i) p1 Rp2 and p3 Rp4 imply either p1 Rp4 or p3 Rp2
(i i i) p1 Rp2 and p2 Rp3 imply either p1 Rp4 or p4 Rp3
The first part of the definition holds that the relation R on P is irreflexive. The second
and third parts of the definition convey the intuitive idea that an indifference interval
should never span a strict preference interval (see Luce 1956).
We now turn to the concept of an indifference interval. This formalizes the idea that
even though one attribute value may be weakly preferred to another attribute value,
they may not be sufficiently different to induce a strict preference for one of them.
The two attribute values will then span an indifference interval, such that all elements
of it are considered indifferent, and such that b1 and b2 delimit the interval from
above and below. For example, in the context of the priority heuristic, the probabilities
p1 = .33 and p2 = .23 would span an indifference interval. The concept is formalized
as follows:
If R is a semiorder on P , and if p1W (RP )p2 and p1 I (RP )p2, the set
P(p1, p2) = {p3 | b1W (R)p3 and p3W (R)p2} (9)
is called an indifference interval.
Finally, we introduce the relation RY on Y which is designed to single out that
part of , where the dominant component, P , does not discriminate. Let P(p3, p4)
be an indifference interval, and let p1, p2 be elements of it. Then for all indifference
intervals P(p3, p4), and for all y1, y2 in Y
y1 RY y2 iff for every p1, p2 in P(p3, p4), (p1, y1)  (p2, y2) (10)
3.2 Axioms
Consider a binary relation  on P × Y , with the derived concepts P , RP , W (RP ),
P(p3, p4) and RY defined above.
Axiom 1  is reflexive, complete, and independent
Axiom 2 RP is a semiorder
Axiom 3 W (RP ) is identical to P
Axiom 4 RY is a simple order
Axiom 5 RY is identical to Y
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Axiom 6 There exists a finite or countable subset of P ,
Q = {..., q−2, q−1, q0, q1, q2, ...} such that for all qi−1, qi , qi+1 in Q
(i) qi R qi−1,
(ii) P(qi−1, qi+1) is an indifference interval,
(iii) for p1 in P , there exists an qi−1, qi in Q with qi P p1 P qi−1
Axiom 7 For every p1 in P , there exists some p2 in P such that p2 I (RP )p1, and
for any p3 in P with p3 P p2, then p3 RP p1
Axioms 1–5 are necessary, while Axioms 6 and 7 are structural. This makes Axioms
6 and 7 less suited for constructing empirical tests. Axiom 6 states that the indifference
intervals on P span all of P (for the priority heuristic, the entire probability scale), and
overlap one another. This axiom ensures that the scales over P and Y agree. Axiom 7
requires that the set of elements indistinguishable from a given element be closed from
above. Together, Axioms 6 and 7 ensure the existence of a supremum (see Sect. 3.3).
Axiom 1 is standard except for the assumption that the preference relation over
gambles  is not necessarily transitive, a property that the priority heuristic does not
always satisfy. The property of independence implies that each attribute in (p1, y1)
affects the relation  independently of the other attribute.
Axiom 2 requires that the strictly dominating part of , RP , is transitive; this follows
from the conjunction of statements (i) and (iii) of the definition of a semiorder. The
definition of a semiorder implies that indifference intervals cannot cover elements
between which there exists a strict preference. Also, the indifference relation I (RP )
will not be transitive, as is the case for the priority heuristic. Axiom 4 is used to impose
an order on that part of , where the first component of the tuples (p1, y1) does not
dominate. Thus if two elements p3 and p4 are indistinguishable, then only elements of
Y should determine choice, and these should be ordered according to a simple order.
In particular, Axiom 4 ensures that the restriction of the set P × Y to P(p3, p4) × Y
agrees with the order between elements of Y , which is a simple order.
Axiom 3 forces the order P on P induced by independence to be identical to the
weak order W (RP ) on P , which was defined in terms of the relation RP . This implies
that both P and RP will be representable using the same numerical scale. Axiom 5
forces the order Y on Y induced by independence to be identical to the simple order
RY on Y , which was defined on the indifference intervals only. This implies that both
Y and RY will be representable using the same numerical scale.
This axiom system is similar to the one used by Luce (1978) for axiomatizing a
two-attribute lexicographic model. Luce’s (1978) model produces trade-offs between
attributes in its second step, whereas this is not the case for the priority heuristic, which
considers the second attribute alone when the first attribute does not determine choice.
3.3 Representation Theorem
Theorem 1 Suppose 〈P × Y,〉 satisfies Axioms 1–7. Then there exist real-valued
functions φP and δP on P , and φY on C such that for all p1, p2 in P , and y1, y2 in Y ,
1. δP (p1) = sup
p2
p2 I (RP )p1
[φP(b2) − φP (p1)] > 0
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2. p1 RP p2 iff φP (p1) > φP (p2) + δP (p2)
3. p1W (RP )p2 iff φP (p1) > φP (p2)
4. y1 RY y2 iff φY (y1) ≥ φY (y2)
5. (p1, y1)  (p2, y2) iff either
(i) φP (p1) > φP (p2) + δP (p2), or
(ii) −δP (p1) ≤ φP (p1) − φP (p2) ≤ δP (p2), and φY (y1) ≥ φY (y2)
If f (.) is a strictly increasing and continuous function, and α, βY > 0 are constants,
then φ′P , δ′P and φ′Y form another representation such that:
φ′P = f (φP ) δ′P = f (φP + δP ) − f (φP ) φ′Y = αφY + βY
If such a representation exists, then Axioms 1–5 must hold. For the proof, see
Appendix.
3.4 Comments
Jointly, Axiom 2 and 4 imply that empirically people find it hard to distinguish between
probabilities that are close (Axiom 2), but they can distinguish very well between
maximum outcomes (Axiom 4). This prediction about people having different abilities
distinguishing outcomes and probabilities is a strong prediction and, to the best of our
knowledge, a new one that should be tested empirically. This prediction is indirectly
supported by research indicating that (i) people spend more time on outcomes than on
probabilities suggesting that outcomes are more important than probabilities (Schkade
and Johnson 1989), (ii) in the extreme, people neglect probabilities altogether, and
instead base their choices on the immediate feelings elicited by the gravity or benefit
of future events (Loewenstein et al. 2001), (iii) highly emotional outcomes tend to
override the impact of probabilities (Sunstein 2003), (iv) anxiety is largely influenced
by the intensity of the shock, not by its probability of occurrence (Deane 1969), and
heuristics have been reported that rely on outcomes while ignoring probabilities, but
not vice versa (Brandstätter et al. 2006, Table 3).
Theorem 1 axiomatizes a family of heuristics of which the priority heuristic is a
special case. By setting φB and φC to the identity functions and δB to .1, the represen-
tation expresses the priority heuristic for the case of equal minimum outcomes. Note
that while setting the function φB to the identity function, the representation theorem
yields a lexicographic structure with linear transformations of the probabilities, the
theorem can also yield structures that use non-linear transformations of probabilities.
4 Towards a theory of bounded rationality
The term “bounded rationality” has been used for at least three different research
programs: Optimization under constraints (Sargent 1993), deviations from optimiza-
tion (Kahneman 2003) and for the study of decision processes in situations, where
optimization may be out of reach (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001; Simon 1955; Selten
2001). Note that these three uses are not the same. The first two emphasize rationality
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and irrationality, respectively, but share optimization as a reference point. The third
program models the process of decision rather than optimization or deviations from
optimization. As mentioned before, in this program, choices reveal decision processes
(Leland 2010). The priority heuristic is such a formal model of the decision process.
The three building blocks—rules for search, stopping and decision—are also part of
other heuristics in what is termed the “adaptive toolbox” of humans (Gigerenzer and
Selten 2001). To date, the study of bounded rationality has accumulated converging
evidence that heuristics can model decision making in both experts and laypeople, and
that heuristics can often make more accurate predictions than can complex forecasting
models, including linear regression, neural networks, Bayesian models and classifica-
tion trees (Katsikopoulos 2011). Yet as Selten (2001, p. 14) noted, a comprehensive,
coherent theory of bounded rationality is not yet available.
This paper is a step in the direction of providing a theory of bounded rationality,
in particular, by providing greater conceptual clarity through the use of an axiomatic
representation. In general, axioms give exact behavioural characterizations which can
be tested empirically. Also, by using axioms on (unobservable) preference relations
and thereby yielding a representation result which models decisions consistent with
heuristics, this paper provides a link between existing axiomatic theories of decision
making and bounded rationality.
The contribution made here can be seen as an exercise consistent with the empiri-
cist school of thought: Starting from observable phenomena, by abstraction a theory
is derived—the priority heuristic—, and from the theory, we obtain mathematical
concepts—the axiomatization. Our approach is, in fact, consistent with the origins of
probability and decision theory: Decision theory was first studied by Blaise Pascal
and Pierre de Fermat as an attempt to understand gambling behaviour. The priority
heuristic is a theory which, as explained above, predicts just these choices between
gambles well, and is therefore a good starting point for the derivation of axiomatic
characterizations of bounded rationality.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
5.1.1 Sufficiency
Statement 1 and 2: Define δP by Statement 1. Axioms 6 and 7 insure the existence
of the supremum, and by Axioms 6(ii) and 6(iii), δP > 0. By the definition of δP and
Axiom 7, Statement 2 follows.
Statement 3: By Axioms 2 and 6, and Theorem 16.7 of Suppes et al. (1989), there
exists a real-valued function φP on P such that p1W (RP )p2 iff φP (p1) > φP (p2),
and with the asserted uniqueness properties.
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Statement 4: By Axiom 4 and Theorem 2.1 of Krantz et al. (1971), there exists
a real-valued function φY on Y such that y1 RY y2 iff φY (y1) ≥ φY (y2), and with the
asserted uniqueness properties.
Statement 5: Statement 4 says that φY preserves RY . By the definition of RY , it is
identical to  when  is applied to P(p3, p4) × Y and restricted to Y . So, φY also
preserves the order  when it is applied to P(p3, p4) × Y and restricted to Y . By
Axiom 6 (ii), there are successive indifference intervals on P with nontrivial regions
of overlap. Forcing the local scales to agree yields a global scale on P × Y . The
restriction of this scale to Y , φY preserves RY as well. Statement 5 follows from this,
together with the other four statements and the whole construction.
5.1.2 Necessity of Axioms 1–5
Axiom 1 The reflexivity and completeness of  follow immediately from Statement
5. To show independence of the first attribute from the second, consider a y1 in Y and
assume (p1, y1)  (p2, y1). By Statement 5, this means φP (p1) > φP (p2)+ δP (p2),
which in turn means that (p1, y2)  (p2, y2) for any y2 in Y . To show independence of
the second attribute from the first, consider a p1 in P and assume (p1, y1)  (p1, y2).
By Statement 5, this means that φY (y1) > φY (y2), which in turn means that (p2, y1) 
(p2, y2) for any p2 in P .
Axiom 2 Part (i) of the definition of a semiorder follows immediately from State-
ment 2.
For Part (ii) of the definition, we assume p1 RP p2, p3 RP p4 and show that if also not
p1 RP p4, then p3 RP p2. By Statement 2, p1 RP p2 impliesφP (p2)+δP (p2) < φP (p1),
and not p1 RP p4 implies φP (p1) ≤ φP (p4)+δP (p4). Thus, also φP (p2)+δP (p2) <
φP (p4)+ δP (p4). This, together with φP (p4)+ δP (p4) < φP (p3) (which holds from
p3 RP p4 and Statement 2), means that φP (p2) + δP (p2) < φP (p3), or, by Statement
2, p3 RP p2.
For Part (iii) of the definition of a semiorder, we assume p1 PP p2 and p2 RP p3,
and considering a p4 in P , we show that either p4 RP p3 or p1 RP p4. Specifically, we
show that, if (a) φP (p4) ≥ φP (p2), then p4 RP p3, and if (b) φP (p4) < φP (p2), then
p1 RP p4.
For (a), p2 RP p3 implies, by Statement 2, that φP (p2) > φP (p3) + δP (p3).
Together with φP (p4) ≥ φP (p2), this means φP (p4) > φP (p3) + δP (p3), or, by
Statement 2, p4 RP p3.
For (b), we first show that p1 RP p4 holds if additionally φP (p4) + δP (p4) ≤
φP (p2) + δP (p2). This, together with φP (p2) + δP (p2) < φP (p1) (by p1 RP p2 and
Statement 2), means that φP (p4) + δP (p4) < φP (p1), or, by Statement 2, p1 RP p4
as required.
To complete the argument, we show by contradiction that φP (p4) + δP (p4) ≤
φP (p2)+ δP (p2). Suppose φP (p4)+ δP (p4) > φP (p2)+ δP (p2). Then it is possible
to find a p5 in P such that: φP (p4) + δP (p4) = φP (p5) > φP (p2) + δP (p2). By
Statement 2, φP (p5) > φP (p2) + δP (p2) implies p5 RP p2.
By Statement 2, φP (p4) + δP (p4) = φP (p5) implies that not p5 RP p4. Also, by
Statement 1,φP (p4)+δP (p4) = φP (p5) implies that φP (p4) < φP (p5) < φP (p5)+
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δP (p5). By Statement 2, this implies that not p4 RP p5. Together, not p5 RP p4 and not
p4 RP p5 imply that p5 I (RP )p4.
By the assumption of (b), φP (p4) < φP (p2) and by Statement 1, φP (p4) <
φP (p2) + δP (p2). By Statement 2 this implies that not p4 RP p2. Furthermore, from
φP (p4) + δP (p4) > φP (p2), which we assumed for contradiction, it follows that not
p2 RP p4. From not p4 RP p2 and not p2 RP p4 it follows that p4 I (RP )p2.
Having established p5 I (RP )p4, p4 I (RP )p2 and p5 RP p2, by the definition of
weak preference p4W (RP )p2.
By Statement 3, p4W (RP )p2 implies φP (p4) > φP (p2) which is inconsistent with
the assumption of (b), φP (p4) < φP (p2). Whence, φP (p4) + δP (p4) ≤ φP (p2) +
δP (p2) as required.
Axiom 3 By Statement 5, φP preserves the order P and by Statement 3, φP preserves
the order W (RP ), so P and W (RP ) are identical.
Axiom 4 By Statement 4 and Theorem 2.1 of Krantz et al. (1971), Axiom 4 follows.
Axiom 5 By Statement 5, φY preserves the order Y and by Statement 4, φY also
preserves RY , so Y and RY are identical.
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